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Abstract
The Internet and social media have fueled enormous interest in social network analysis. New tools continue to
be developed and used to analyse our personal connections, with particular emphasis on detecting communities or
identifying key individuals in a social network. This raises privacy concerns that are likely to exacerbate in the future.
With this in mind, we ask the question: Can individuals or groups actively manage their connections to evade social
network analysis tools? By addressing this question, the general public may better protect their privacy, oppressed
activist groups may better conceal their existence, and security agencies may better understand how terrorists escape
detection. We first study how an individual can evade “network centrality” analysis without compromising his or her
influence within the network. We prove that an optimal solution to this problem is hard to compute. Despite this
hardness, we demonstrate that even a simple heuristic, whereby attention is restricted to the individual’s immediate
neighbourhood, can be surprisingly effective in practice. For instance, it could disguise Mohamed Atta’s leading position
within the WTC terrorist network, and that is by rewiring a strikingly-small number of connections. Next, we study
how a community can increase the likelihood of being overlooked by community-detection algorithms. We propose a
measure of concealment, expressing how well a community is hidden, and use it to demonstrate the effectiveness of
a simple heuristic, whereby members of the community either “unfriend” certain other members, or “befriend” some
non-members, in a coordinated effort to camouflage their community.
1 Introduction
The on-going process of datafication continues to turn
many aspects of our lives into computerised data [23].
This data is being collected and analysed for various di-
verse applications by public and private institutions alike.
One particular type of data that has received significant
attention over the past decade concerns our social con-
nections. To this end, a number of tools have been advo-
cated for social network analysis, with particular empha-
sis on the detection of communities or the identification
of key individuals within a network. For all their benefits,
the widespread use of such tools raises legitimate privacy
concerns. For instance, Mislove et al. [24] demonstrated
how, by analysing Facebook’s social network structure,
as well as the attributes of some users, it is possible to
infer otherwise-private information about other Facebook
users.
To tackle such privacy issues, various countermeasures
have been proposed, ranging from strict legal controls [1],
through algorithmic solutions [15], to market-like mech-
anisms that allow participants to monetize their personal
information [20]. However, to date only few such counter-
measures have been implemented, leaving the privacy is-
sue largely unresolved, e.g., as is evident from the very re-
cent release of Facebook’s “Global Government Requests
Report” [2], which revealed a global increase in govern-
ment requests to secretly access user data. Furthermore, it
is unlikely that effective legal mechanisms will be intro-
duced in countries with authoritarian regimes, where so-
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
8.
00
37
5v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 1 
Au
g 2
01
6
cial networking sites and other internet content is policed,
and anti-governmental blogs and activities are censored
[17, 18].
Against this background, we ask the question: can in-
dividuals or communities proactively manage their so-
cial connections so that their privacy is less exposed to
the workings of network analysis tools? To put it differ-
ently, can we disguise our standing in the network to es-
cape detection? This matters because, on one hand, it as-
sists the general public in protecting their privacy against
intrusion from government and corporate interests; on
the other hand, it assists counterterrorism units and law-
enforcement agencies in understanding how criminals
and terrorists could escape detection, especially given
their increasing reliance of social-media survival strate-
gies [27, 14]. To date, however, this fundamental ques-
tion has received little attention in the literature, as most
research efforts have focused on developing ever more so-
phisticated network analysis tools, rather than considering
how to evade them.
To address the above question from an individual’s
viewpoint, we focus on three main centrality measures,
namely degree, closeness, and betweenness, and study
how one can avoid being highlighted by those measures
without compromising his or her influence. Since, from a
graph-theoretic perspective, this is fundamentally an opti-
mization problem, we analyse its computational complex-
ity to illuminate the theoretical limits of such capability
as disguising oneself. Although we show that an optimal
solution is often hard to compute, we demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of a surprisingly simple heuristic, whereby the
rewiring of social connections is restricted to the individ-
ual’s immediate network neighbourhood. Specifically, it
involves two actions that are already available on popular
social-media platforms: (i) “unfriending” certain neigh-
bours; (ii) introducing certain neighbours to each other.
From a group’s viewpoint, we study how a commu-
nity can conceal itself to increase the likelihood of being
overlooked by community-detection algorithms. To this
end, we propose a measure of concealment, designed to
quantify the degree to which a group of individuals is hid-
den. Using this measure, we demonstrate the effective-
ness of yet another simple heuristic, whereby members of
the community either “unfriend” certain other members,
or “befriend” some non-members to blend into the sur-
rounding web of social connections.
2 The Model
This section presents the basic concepts and objectives;
all formal definitions can be found in the Supporting In-
formation.
Centrality Measures: A measure of centrality reflects
the importance of any given node in the network. Ar-
guably, the standard centrality measures are: degree,
closeness and betweenness [11]. In particular, for any
given node v, the degree centrality focuses on the number
of neighbours that v has (the more neighbours the better).
In contrast, the closeness centrality quantifies the impor-
tance of v based on its average distance to other nodes
(the closer the better). Finally, the betweenness centrality
focuses on the number of shortest paths on which v lies
(the more paths the better).
Models of Influence: The best established mathemat-
ical models of influence are the Independent Cascade
model [12] and the Linear Threshold model [16]. Ba-
sically, both models start with some “active” subset of
nodes, called the seed set.1 Then, as time passes (in dis-
crete rounds), new nodes become activated due to the in-
fluence from other previously-activated nodes. The two
models differ in the way influence propagates through
the network. Specifically, in the Independent Cascade
model, an active node activates each of its neighbours
with some pre-defined probability. In contrast, with the
Linear Threshold model, each node has some random pre-
defined threshold, and gets activated when the number of
its active neighbors exceeds that threshold. Under either
model, the influence of a node, v, on another, w, is mea-
sured as the probability that w gets activated when the
seed set is {v}.
First Objective: Given a network and a source node, v†,
our objective is to conceal the importance of v† by de-
creasing its centrality (according to each of the aforemen-
tioned measures of centrality) without compromising its
influence over the network (according to the aforemen-
tioned models of influence). We do so by rewiring the
links of the network, without exceeding a certain bud-
get—the maximum number of links allowed to be mod-
ified (i.e., added or removed). To simplify our analysis,
we divide the process of disguising v† into two consecu-
tive phases. In the first phase, part of the budget is spent
on minimizing the three centrality measures, during which
the influence of v† is likely to decrease—we call this the
centrality minimization problem. The second phase in-
volves spending the remaining budget to recover as much
as possible of the influence of v† while avoiding the addi-
tion of any links that were removed during the centrality
1An active node can be thought of as an infected person who influ-
ences, but not necessarily infects, his or her neighbours. Analogously,
an inactive node can be a healthy person who is influenced by any in-
fected neighbours he or she may have; stronger influence corresponds to
stronger chances of infection.
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minimization phase. Here, we consider two variants of
this latter problem: (i) the individual influence recovery
problem, where the goal is to recover the influence of v†
over every single node, and (ii) the global influence re-
covery problem, where the goal is to recover the sum of
influences of v† over all nodes.
Second Objective: Given a community, i.e., subset of
nodes, C†, our goal is the conceal the identity of C† by
hiding its existence within the network. Recall that a com-
munity structure is a partition of the set of nodes into dis-
joint and exhaustive subsets, or “communities”. As such,
C† is exposed if a community-detection algorithm is able
to return a community structure, CS , such that C† ∈ CS .
We hide C† by rewiring the links of the network, again
according to some budget, i.e., maximum number of per-
mitted modifications.
3 Disguising Individuals
3.1 Hardness Results
Our main theoretical results are summarized in Table 1
(for more details, see theorems 1 through 4 in the Support-
ing Information). As shown in the table, all the problems
under consideration turn out to be NP-complete, with the
exception of minimizing degree centrality. To put it dif-
ferently, finding an optimal way to disguise one’s impor-
tance in a social network is extremely difficult (from a
computational point of view), not to mention the fact that
it requires knowing the entire network structure, and may
also require adding or removing links that are far from the
source node.
Disguising centrality (Degree) P
Disguising centrality (Closeness) NPC
Disguising centrality (Betweenness) NPC
Individual influence recovery (LT) NPC
Individual influence recovery (IC) NPC
Global influence recovery (LT) NPC
Global influence recovery (IC) NPC
Table 1: Summary of our computational-hardness results.
3.2 A Scalable Heuristic
Typically, one has very limited knowledge of the social
ties beyond his or her immediate friends, or maybe friends
of friends. However, even if one was able to somehow ac-
quire information about the entire network structure, our
theoretical results from the previous subsection suggest
that it is extremely unlikely for such an individual to have
the necessary computational power to optimally disguise
himself or herself. Against this background, we inves-
tigate the possibility of disguising one’s centrality ade-
quately (albeit not optimally) while restricting one’s at-
tention to only his or her immediate neighbourhood, and
without requiring massive computational power nor ex-
pertise in sophisticated optimization techniques. With this
in mind, we propose a heuristic whose instructions are
simple enough for an average user of social-networking
services to understand and use, regardless of their techni-
cal background. Our heuristic, called ROAM—Remove
One, Add Many—is detailed in the box below, and an il-
lustration of how it works is presented in Figure 1.
The ROAM heuristic given a budget b:
• Step 1: Remove the link between the source
node, v†, and its neighbour of choice, v0;
• Step 2: Connect v0 to b − 1 nodes of choice,
who are neighbours of v† but not of v0 (if there
are fewer than b − 1 such neighbours, connect
v0 to all of them).
Let us now comment on this heuristic, starting with
Step 1. As far as the centrality of v† is concerned, this
step can only be beneficial. More specifically, cutting off
v† from one of its neighbours is the only way to reduce
the degree of v†. Likewise, Step 1 can only decrease the
closeness of v† (this happens when all shortest paths be-
tween v† and some other node run through the removed
link), and can only decrease the betweenness of v† (this
happens when some of the shortest paths going through
v† contain the removed link). However, as far as the in-
fluence of v† is concerned, Step 1 may be detrimental, as
it deprives v† from its direct influence over v0.
Moving on to Step 2, this step is primarily designed to
compensate for any influence that v† may have lost dur-
ing the previous step. Specifically, it creates new, indi-
rect connections between v† and v0 to compensate for the
direct one that was removed earlier. As far as the cen-
trality of v† is concerned, while Step 2 does not affect
the degree of v†, it increases the degrees of some of its
neighbours, which in turn contributes towards concealing
the relative importance of v† within the network. Further-
more, the addition of a link, (v0, vi)—where vi is some
neighbour of v†—cannot increase the closeness centrality
of v† beyond its original state, i.e., its state before running
the ROAM heuristic altogether. This is because any path
containing (v0, vi) and (vi, v†) is certainly longer than an
original path in which (v0, vi) and (vi, v†) were replaced
with (v0, v†). Likewise, the addition of this link cannot
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Original network
Mohamed Atta
1st in Degree centrality ranking
1st in Closeness centrality ranking
1st in Betweenness centrality ranking
IC influence = 2.55
LT influence = 6.44
6
After two executions of our heuristic
Mohamed Atta
5th in Degree centrality ranking
4th in Closeness centrality ranking
11th in Betweenness centrality ranking
IC influence = 2.21
LT influence = 6.90
6
After one execution of our heuristic
Mohamed Atta
3rd in Degree centrality ranking
2nd in Closeness centrality ranking
5th in Betweenness centrality ranking
IC influence = 2.39
LT influence = 6.72
6 66
25 2525
16 1616
21 2121
Figure 1: Executing the ROAM heuristic twice on the 9/11 terrorist network to hide Mohamed Atta—one of the
ringleaders of the attack [19]. The red link is the one to be to removed by the algorithm, and the dashed links are the
ones to be added.
increase the betweenness centrality of v† beyond its orig-
inal state, because replacing a direct connection between
v† and v0 with an indirect one cannot increase the per-
centage of shortest paths going through v†.
Finally, let us comment on the how to choose v0, and
how to choose the neighbours of v† to connect to v0.
Based on the simulation study reported in the Support-
ing Information, we choose v0 to be the neighbour of
v† with the most connections, and we connect v0 to the
b − 1 neighbours of v† with the least connections. With
such choices, it is relatively straightforward to execute the
ROAM heuristic on existing social-networking services.
On Facebook, for example, one can typically view the
number of friends that each of his friends has (even if
some of them make this information private, one can still
choose among those that do not). Once the nodes are cho-
sen, Step 1 simply requires v† to “unfriend” v0, whereas
Step 2 requires v† to “suggest” the friendship of v0 to the
other chosen nodes. Note that, on Facebook, v† can only
introduce two individuals to each other if they were both
v†’s friends. As such, Step 2 must be executed before
Step 1, that is, v† must end the friendship with v0 after
introducing v0 to the other nodes.
4 Disguising Communities
4.1 A Measure of Concealment
We propose a measure of how well a community, C†, is
hidden in a community structure, CS . Note that C† is
not necessarily a member of CS . To put it differently,
when describing C† as a “community”, we mean to use
this term in its broader sense, where C† is essentially just
a subset of nodes. As such, when measuring how well C†
is hidden in CS , it may well be the case that the members
of C† are spread out across multiple communities in CS .
To this end, we start by proposing two measures, de-
noted by µ′ and µ′′, which capture different aspects of
concealment. In particular, µ′ is defined for every com-
munity C† ⊆ V and every community structure CS as
follows:
µ′(C†,CS ) =
|{Ci ∈ CS : Ci ∩ C† 6= ∅}|−1
max(|CS |−1, 1)maxCi∈CS (|Ci ∩ C†|)
.
Basically, this measure focuses on how well the members
of C† are spread out across the communities in CS . In
more detail, we have µ′(C†,CS ) ∈ [0, 1], and the greater
µ′(C†,CS ), the greater the concealment of C† in CS .
Note that the numerator grows linearly with the number
of communities that C† is distributed over. Subtracting
1 from both the numerator and the |CS | term of the de-
nominator is meant to handle the worst case, where all
members of C† appear in a single (possibly larger) com-
munity in CS ; in this case, we have: µ′(C†,CS ) = 0.
In contrast, the term maxC∈CS (|C ∩ C†|) is meant to
promote community structures in which the members of
C† are more evenly distributed across the communities
in CS . As such, the maximum concealment is achieved
when the members of C† are uniformly distributed, with
each member appearing in a separate community; in this
case: µ′(C†,CS ) = 1.
Moving on to the second measure, µ′′, it is defined as:
µ′′(C†,CS ) =
∑
Ci∈CS
|Ci \ C†|
max(n− |C†|, 1) .
Intuitively, µ′′ focuses on how well C† is “hidden in
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Figure 2: How the concealment of C† differs from one
community structure to another according to µwhere α =
0.5.
the crowd”; it grows linearly with the number of non-
members of C† that appear with members of C† in the
same community in CS . Note that µ′′(C†,CS ) ∈ [0, 1],
and the greater the value, the greater the concealment of
C† in CS .
Having defined µ′ and µ′′, we now use the two as
building blocks to construct a single measure whereby the
trade-off between µ′ and µ′′ is controlled by a parameter,
α ∈ [0, 1]. More formally, our proposed measure of con-
cealment of a communityC† in a community structure CS
is:
µ(C†,CS ) = αµ′(C†,CS ) + (1− α)µ′′(C†,CS ).
Figure 2 presents a sample network with three differ-
ent community structures, and highlights the community
that we wish to conceal, namely C†. For every such com-
munity structure, we measure the concealment of C† us-
ing our measure µ with α = 0.5. In particular, Fig-
ure 2(a) presents one extreme where µ(C†,CS ) = 0, re-
flecting the fact that C† is completely exposed as a com-
munity. Figure 2(b) presents the other extreme where
µ(C†,CS ) = 1, reflecting the fact that C† is completely
hidden, since every member appears in a separate com-
munity along some non-member ofC†. Finally, a case be-
tween the two extremes is presented in Figure 2(c), where
µ(C†,CS ) = 38 .
4.2 A Scalable Heuristic
We set to develop a simple heuristic that can be applied
by any group of people regardless of their technical back-
ground or their knowledge of the network topology. Af-
ter all, it is of little use to have an exact algorithm that
can only be understood or applied by optimization experts
armed with enormous processing power. Likewise, exact
algorithms that require knowing the entire network topol-
ogy may prove useless, since such knowledge is rarely
available.
Our heuristic, called DICE—Disconnect Internally,
Connect Externally—is detailed in the box below.
The DICE heuristic given a budget b:
• Step 1: Disconnect d ≤ b links from within
C†;
• Step 2: Connect b−d nodes from within C† to
b− d nodes from outside of C†.
This heuristic is inspired by modularity [26]—a widely
used index for measuring the quality of any given com-
munity structure. Specifically, it promotes structures
that have dense connections within communities and
sparse connections between them. As such, community-
detection algorithms are typically designed to search for
a structure that maximizes modularity. With this in mind,
Step 1 of our heuristic decreases the density of the con-
nections within C†, whereas Step 2 increases the connec-
tions between C† and other communities. In doing so, a
community-detection algorithm is more likely to overlook
C†, i.e., it would fail to recognizeC† as a community, and
instead assign its members to multiple communities.
Finally, let us comment on how DICE can be applied
in practice. On Facebook, for example, Step 1 requires
some members to “unfriend” other members, which is
rather straightforward. As for Step 2, members must
send a friendship request to non-members; these could
be classmates, coworkers, neighbours living next door, or
even random people (it is possible to try multiple random
friendship requests, hoping that some of them would be
successful).
5 Experiments
5.1 Data sets
We experiment with two types of real-life networks:
(a). Covert organizations: we consider three terrorist net-
work, responsible for the WTC 9/11 attacks [19];
the 2002 Bali attack [13]; and the 2004 Madrid train
bombings [13];
(b). Social networks: we study anonymized fragments of
three social networks, namely Facebook, Twitter and
Google+. These fragments are taken from SNAP—
the Stanford Network Analysis Platform [21].
We also study randomly-generated networks, namely:
(a). Scale-free networks using the Barabasi-Albert model
[4]. We write ScaleFree(x, y) where x is the number
of nodes; y is the number of links added with each
node;
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Figure 3: Executing ROAM multiple, consecutive times (the x-axis represents the number of executions). Given the
Madrid-attack network, 50 scale-free networks, and a medium-sized fragment of Facebook’s network (333 nodes,
5038 edges), the subfigures show the source node’s ranking (according to different centrality measures), and the
relative change in its influence value (according to different influence models). Results are for ROAM(b) : b = 2, 3, 4,
where b is the budget in each execution.
(b). Small-world networks using the Watts-Strogatz
model [33]. We write SmallWorld(x, y, z) where
x is the number of nodes; y is the average degree; z
is the rewiring probability;
(c). Random graphs generated using the Erdos-Renyi
model [9]. We write RandomGraph(x, y) where x
is the number of nodes; y is the expected average de-
gree.
For each type of randomly-generated networks, we report
the average result taken over 50 such networks, with the
error bars representing the 95% confidence intervals.
5.2 Experimenting with ROAM
Each of our experiments consists of a network, a budget,
a source node, and an influence model. More specifically,
we experiment with a budget of 2, 3, and 4. The source
node is assumed to be the one with the lowest sum of
centrality rankings (ties are broken uniformly at random).
Whenever the Independent Cascade model is used, an ac-
tivation probability of 0.15 is assumed on each link. On
the other hand, whenever the Linear Threshold model is
used, a uniform distribution of thresholds is assumed (see
the Supporting Information for more details). For both
models, the influence values are approximated using the
Monte-Carlo method. In each of these experiment, the
ROAM heuristic is executed multiple, consecutive times.
Figure 3 shows the results of some of our experiments
(the remaining results are provided in the Supporting In-
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(the x-axis represents the percentage of completed
rounds), given the Madrid-attack network, scale-free net-
works, and a fragment of Facebook’s network (consisting
of 333 nodes, 5038 edges).
formation). The centrality plots depict the ranking of the
source node, whereas the influence plots depict its rela-
tive influence value (compared to the original influence
value before executing the heuristic altogether). As can
be seen, the heuristic is effective in decreasing the source
node’s ranking, and this effectiveness increases with the
budget spent on rewiring the network. As for influence,
the performance of the heuristic varies depending on the
network, the influence model, and the budget. Overall, the
greater the budget, the greater the influence, e.g., a budget
of 4 manages to maintain (or even increase) the influence
in 4 out of 6 cases.
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5.3 Experimenting with DICE
For each network, we experiment with seven community-
detection algorithms implemented in the igraph package
of the R language (version 1.0.1), namely: Eigenvec-
tor [25], Betweenness [26], Walktrap [29], Louvain [6],
Greedy [7], Infomap [31] and Spinglass [30]. As such,
every experiment consists of a community-detection al-
gorithm and a network. The experiment starts by running
the algorithm to obtain a community structure, CS . After
that, the community to be hidden, i.e., C†, is chosen to be
the element in CS whose size is the median of the sizes
of all communities in CS (ties are broken uniformly at
random). Although C† does not necessary have to be an
element of CS , we choose it this way in order to study the
worst case scenario in which C† is initially exposed com-
pletely. The experiment then proceeds in rounds, each in-
volving the execution of DICE followed by the execution
of the community-detection algorithm, to measure how
well C† is hidden in the new outcome of the algorithm
(this measurement is done using µ with α = 0.5). We set
the number of rounds to be
⌈|C†|/b⌉. In each round, we
disconnect d links from within C† (chosen uniformly at
random), and then connect b− d members of C† to b− d
non-members of C† (again chosen uniformly at random).
Due to this randomness in our implementation, DICE may
yield different results in different executions. Therefore,
we repeat each experiment multiple times, and report the
95% confidence interval.
Figure 4 shows the results of some of our experiments
(for the remaining results see the Supporting Informa-
tion). As can be seen, DICE is able to hide the commu-
nity, C† with varying levels of success, depending on the
community-detection algorithm being used. Importantly,
the performance does not appear to be overly-sensitive to
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the parameter d. This is important because it provides the
members of C† with the ability to control this parameter
as needed (i.e., control the trade-off between the number
of internal edges being removed, and the number of exter-
nal edges being added). For example, the members of C†
might be interested in hiding their community as much as
possible, while removing as few internal links as possi-
ble (after all, the added external links are fake, serving no
purpose other than disguising the community, whereas the
removed internal links are real; they existed in the com-
munity for a reason). In such a case, since the addition
of an external link is not entirely under the control of C†
(as it requires the consent of a non-member), the number
of newly-added external links may be insufficient for pro-
viding a satisfactory level of concealment, in which case
the members can compensate for this by sacrificing more
internal links, i.e., by increasing the parameter d.
Figure 5 illustrates the average value of our conceal-
ment measure, µ, in each experiment where b = 4 and
d = 2. In particular, each row represents a community-
detection algorithm, each row represents a network, and
the intensity of the colour in each cell represents the aver-
age value of µ, taken over 50 simulations, either by gen-
erating a new random network in each simulation, or by
re-running the simulation over and over on the same real-
life network (recall that our implementation of DICE is
non-deterministic, and may yield different results on the
same network). As can be seen, the Infomap [31] algo-
rithm seems to be the most difficult to fool.
6 Discussion
Our goal was to understand the practical limits of disguis-
ing individuals and communities, to increase the likeli-
hood of them being overlooked by social network anal-
ysis tools. Our main result is that, despite the hardness
of finding an optimal solution, disguise is surprisingly
easy in practice using simple heuristics that are readily-
implementable even by lay people. Viewed from a dif-
ferent perspective, our work can be seen as an extension
of the sensitivity analyses of centrality measures [8] and
community detection algorithms [28]; while such analy-
ses typically consider the effects of small network alter-
ations, we consider changes that are much wider in scope,
and strategic in nature.
On one hand, our findings contribute towards charting
the limits of protecting privacy in social networks. On
the other hand, they expose implications for using generic
social network analysis tools in security applications; the
fact that such tools can be easily misled underlines the
need for developing specialized tools that account for the
nature of links and nodes in the network and not just the
topology per se.
Despite these findings, our understanding of how to
evade social network analysis tools is still limited, with
many research questions yet to be answered. For in-
stance, we still do not know how a relationship can be
hidden from the eyes of link-prediction algorithms [22],
or how an individual can evade detection by Eigenvector
centrality—the backbone of Google’s search engine.
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A Organization of the Appendix
In this document, we formally define the relevant centrality measures and influence models, before defining our op-
timization problems (Section B). After that, we present the proofs of our theoretical results (Section C), followed by
a discussion of various experimental results (Section D). Finally, we study the problem of constructing a network
from scratch, designed for the sole purpose of concealing the identity of the leader while ensuring that it is a highly
influential node in the network (Section E).
B Definitions
Basic Notation: LetG = (V,E) ∈ G denote a network, where V = {v1, . . . , vn} is the set of n nodes andE ⊆ V ×V
is the set of edges. A path is a sequence of distinct nodes, 〈vl, . . . , vk〉, such that every two consecutive nodes are
connected by an edge. The length of a path is considered to be the number of edges in that path. For any pair of
nodes, vi, vj in G, the set of all shortest paths between them is denoted by spG(vi, vj), and the distance between
them is denoted by dG(vi, vj), where distance is defined as the length of a shortest path between the two. In case
of an undirected network G we do not discern between edges (vi, vj) and (vj , vi); otherwise the network is said to
be directed. Furthermore, G is said to be connected (strongly connected for directed networks) if there exists a path
between every pair of nodes in G.
We denote by NpredG (vi) the set of predecessors of vi in G, that is, N
pred
G (vi) = {vj ∈ V : (vj , vi) ∈ E}. On
the other hand, we denote by N succG (vi) the set of successors of vi in G, i.e., N
succ
G (vi) = {vj ∈ V : (vi, vj) ∈ E}.
Finally, we denote by NG(vi) the set of neighbours of vi in G, i.e., NG(vi) = N
pred
G (vi)∪N succG (vi). For the case of
undirected graph, we will assume that NG(vi) = N
pred
G (vi) = N
succ
G (vi).
To make the notation more readable, we will often denote two arbitrary nodes by v and w, instead of vi and vj .
Moreover, we will often omit the network itself from the notation whenever it is clear from the context, e.g., by writing
d(v, w) instead of dG(v, w); this applies not only to the notation presented thus far, but to all notation.
We consider a community structure, CS = {C1, . . . , Ck}, to be a partition of the set of nodes into disjoint
and exhaustive subsets, or communities.2 Formally, it satisfies the following three conditions: ∀Ci∈CSCi ⊆ V ,⋃
Ci∈CS Ci = V , and ∀Ci,Cj∈CSCi ∩ Cj = ∅.
Centrality Measures: Formally, a centrality measure [11] is a function c : G× V → R. The degree centrality [32] is
denoted by cdegr, the closeness centrality [5] is denoted by cclos, and the betweeness centrality [3, 10] is denoted by
cbetw. Specifically, given a node vi ∈ V and an undirected network, we have:
cdegr(G, vi) =
|NG(vi)|
n− 1
cclos(G, vi) =
n− 1∑
vj∈V dG(vi, vj)
cbetw(G, vi) =
2
(n− 1)(n− 2)
∑
vj ,vk∈V \{vi}
|{p ∈ spG(vj , vk) : vi ∈ p}|
|spG(vj , vk)|
On the other hand, given a directed network, we have:
cdegr(G, vi) =
|NG(vi)|
2(n− 1)
cclos(G, vi) =
1
n− 1
∑
vj∈V
1
dG(vi, vj)
2Some works have considered overlapping community structures [34]. However, as common in the literature, we restrict our attention to disjoint
communities.
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cbetw(G, vi) =
1
(n− 1)(n− 2)
∑
vj ,vk∈V \{vi}
|{p ∈ spG(vj , vk) : vi ∈ p}|
|spG(vj , vk)| +
|{p ∈ spG(vk, vj) : vi ∈ p}|
|spG(vk, vj)|
Models of Influence: The propagation of influence through the network is often modeled as follows: when a certain
node is sufficiently influenced by its neighbour(s), it becomes “active”, in which case it starts to influence any “inac-
tive” neighbour(s) it may have, and so on. Of course, to initiate this propagation process, a set of nodes needs to be
activated right from the start; this set is called the seed set. Assuming that time moves in discrete rounds, we denote by
I(t) ⊆ V the set of nodes that are active at round t, implying that I(1) is the seed set. The way influence propagates
from the seed set to the remaining nodes depends on the influence model under consideration. Here, the two main
models of influence are:
• Independent Cascade [12]: In this model, every pair of nodes is assigned an activation probability, p : V × V →
[0, 1]. Then, in every round, t > 1, every node v ∈ V that became active in round t − 1 activates every inactive
successor, w ∈ N succ(v) \ I(t − 1), with probability p(v, w). The process ends when there are no new active
nodes, i.e., when I(t) = I(t− 1).
• Linear Threshold [16]: In this model, every node v ∈ V is assigned a threshold value tv which is sampled
(according to some probability distribution) from the set {0, . . . , |Npred(v)|}. Then, in every round, t > 1, every
inactive node v becomes active, i.e., becomes a member of I(t), if: |I(t− 1)∩Npred(v)|≥ tv . The process ends
when I(t) = I(t− 1).
In either model, the influence of a node, v, on another, w, is denoted by inf G(v, w) and defined as the probability that
w gets activated given the seed set {v} (we make the common assumption that inf G(v, v) = 0 for all v ∈ V ). The
influence of v over the entire network G is then: inf G(v) =
∑
w∈V inf G(v, w).
First Objective (Disguising a Node): Roughly speaking, given a source node, v†, and a limited budget, b,
specifying the maximum number of edges that are allowed to be added or removed, our goal is to first rewire the
network so as to minimize the centrality of v†, and then to further rewire the network so as to “recover” the influence
of v† (in an attempt to compensate for any influence that v† might have lost during the centrality-minimization phase).
We consider two variants of the influence-recovery problem; the first focuses on the influence of v† over every single
node, whereas the second focuses on the influence of v† over the network as a whole. In both cases, only the addition
of edges is considered, since the removal of edges can only decrease the influence of v†. Next, we formally define the
aforementioned problems.
Definition 1 (Disguising Centrality) This problem is defined by a tuple, (G, v†, b, c, Rˆ, Aˆ), where G = (V,E) ∈ G
is a network, v† ∈ V is the source node (whose centrality is to be minimized), b ∈ N is a budget specifying the
maximum number of edges that can be added or removed, c : G × V → R is a centrality measure, Rˆ ⊆ E is a set
of edges whose removal is forbidden, Aˆ ⊆ (V × V ) \ E is a set of edges whose addition is forbidden. The goal is
then to identify two sets of edges, R∗ ⊆ (E \ Rˆ) and A∗ ⊆ (V × V ) \ (E ∪ Aˆ), such that: |A∗|+|R∗|≤ b and
G∗ = (V, (E ∪A∗) \R∗) is connected (strongly connected if G is directed) and G∗ is in:
argmin
G′∈{(V,(E∪A)\R):R⊆(E\Rˆ),A⊆(V×V )\(E∪Aˆ)}
c(G′, v†).
Definition 2 (Individual Influence recovery) This problem is defined by a tuple, (G, v†, inf , Aˆ, f), where G =
(V,E) ∈ G is a network, v† ∈ V is the source node (whose influence is to be recovered), inf : V × V → R is
an influence measure, Aˆ ⊆ (V × V ) \ E is a set of edges whose addition is forbidden, and f : V → R specifies the
influences to be recovered (i.e., for every vi ∈ V we want the influence of v† over vi to be at least f(vi)). The goal is
then to identify a set of edges, A∗, that is in:
argmin
A⊆(V×V )\(E∪Aˆ):∀vi∈V inf (V,E∪A)(v†,vi)≥f(vi)
|A|.
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Definition 3 (Global Influence recovery) This problem is defined by a tuple, (G, v†, inf , Aˆ, φ), whereG = (V,E) ∈
G is a network, v† ∈ V is the source node (whose influence is to be recovered), inf : V × V → R is an influence
measure, Aˆ ⊆ (V × V ) \ E is a set of edges whose addition is forbidden, and φ ∈ R is the total influence to be
recovered. The goal is then to identify a set of edges, A∗, that is in:
argmin
A⊆(V×V )\(E∪Aˆ):inf (V,E∪A)(v†)≥φ
|A|.
Second Objectives (Disguising a Community): Roughly speaking, given a community to be hidden, C†, and a
limited budget, b, specifying the maximum number of edges that are allowed to be added or removed, our goal is
to rewire the network so as to hide C†. To this end, we propose a measure of concealment, µ, defined for every
community C† ⊆ V and every community structure CS , as follows:3
µ(C†,CS ) = αµ′(C†,CS ) + (1− α)µ′′(C†,CS ),
where α ∈ [0, 1] and:
µ′(C†,CS ) =
|{Ci ∈ CS : Ci ∩ C† 6= ∅}|−1
max(|CS |−1, 1)maxCi∈CS (|Ci ∩ C†|)
µ′′(C†,CS ) =
∑
Ci∈CS
|Ci \ C†|
max(n− |C†|, 1) .
Note that µ(C†,CS ) ∈ [0, 1] for all C† and CS , with greater values indicating greater levels of concealment of C† in
CS . Having presented our concealment measure, we are now ready to formally introduce our problem.
Definition 4 (Disguising a Community) This problem is defined by a tuple, (G,C†, alg , b), where G = (V,E) is a
network, C† ⊆ V is the community to be hidden, alg is a community-detection algorithm, and b ∈ N is a budget
specifying the maximum number of edges that can be added or removed. The goal is then to find a set of edges to be
added,A∗ ⊆ (V ×V )\E, and another to be removed,R∗ ⊆ E, such that |A∗|+|R∗|≤ b andG∗ = (V, (E∪A∗)\R∗)
is in:
argmax
G′∈{(V,(E∪A)\R) : A⊆(V×V )\E, R⊆E, |A|+|R|≤b}
µ(C†, alg(G′)),
where alg(G) is the community structure returned by the algorithm alg given the network G.
Note that the above optimization problem requires C† to know the exact community-detection algorithm that the
adversary is using. Since such knowledge is hardly available, we avoid this requirement, and instead aim to develop a
general-purpose heuristic, designed for no particular community-detection algorithm.
C Proofs
From the computational point of view, disguising the degree centrality of v† is easy, since the only way to decrease this
centrality is to remove edges connecting v† to its neighbour(s). Next, we study the problems of disguising closeness
centrality and betweenness centrality, followed by the problem of influence recovery under the Independent-Cascade
model and under the Linear-Threshold model.
Theorem 1 Disguising closeness centrality is NP-complete.
3Note that C† is not necessarily a member of CS . To put it differently, when describing C† as a “community” we use this term in its broader
sense, where C† is essentially just a subset of nodes. As such, when measuring how well C† is hidden in CS , it may well be the case that the
members of C† are spread out across multiple communities in CS .
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Proof. The decision version of the optimization problem is the following: given a network G = (V,E), a source node
v†, two sets Rˆ ⊆ E, Aˆ ⊆ (V × V ) \ E, a budget b ∈ N and a value x ∈ R, does there exist two sets R∗ ⊆ (E \ Rˆ)
and A∗ ⊆ (V × V ) \ (E ∪ Aˆ) such that |A∗|+|R∗|≤ b, and the network (V, (E ∪ A∗) \ R∗) is connected (strongly
connected if G is directed) and cclos((V, (E ∪A∗) \R∗), v†) ≤ x?
This problem is in NP, as given a solution, i.e., two sets A∗ and R∗, we can verify whether cclos((V, (E ∪ A∗) \
R∗), v†) ≤ x in polynomial time; this only requires computing the closeness centrality of node v† in network (V, (E∪
A∗) \R∗).
We will now show that the decision version is NP-hard. To this end, let us denote by q ∈ R the smallest possible
closeness centrality of v† in any (strongly) connected network whose set of nodes is V . One can see that q = 2/n in
the case of undirected networks, and q = (
∑n−1
i=1
1
i )/(n− 1) in the case of directed network; this happens if and only
if:
• the network is a path of which v† is an end (when dealing with undirected networks); or
• the network is a directed cycle (when dealing with directed networks).
Let us denote such a network by Q; the closeness centrality of v† in Q is then q. With this in mind, the proof involves
a reduction from the Hamiltonian cycle problem (i.e., the problem of determining whether there exists a cycle that
visits each node exactly once) to the decision problem of determining whether it is possible to reduce the closeness
centrality of v† to a value smaller than, or equal to, q.
To this end, given some arbitrary network, G′ = (V ′, E′), be it directed or undirected, let us modify G′ so as to
obtain a new network, G = (V,E), as illustrated in figures 6 and 7. Formally, we do so by choosing some arbitrary
node, w ∈ V ′, and then setting:
V = V ′ ∪ {v†, v1, v2}, E = E′ ∪ {(v†, w), (v1, v2)} ∪ {(v, v1) : v ∈ V ′, v ∈ NG′(w)},
in the case of undirected networks, or setting:
V = V ′ ∪ {v†, v1}, E = E′ ∪ {(v†, w), (v1, v†)} ∪ {(v, v1) : v ∈ V ′, v ∈ NpredG′ (w)},
in the case of directed networks.
We will now show that the Hamiltonian cycle problem in G′ is equivalent to the following decision problem: Given
network G and budget b = |E′|−|V ′|+|NpredG′ (w)|, where Aˆ = Rˆ = ∅, determine whether it is possible to reduce the
closeness centrality of v† to a value≤ q, by removing at most b edges from G. Throughout the remainder of the proof,
the edges and nodes in G that were in G′ will be referred to as “original”.
Firstly, we will show that if G′ has a Hamiltonian cycle then it is possible to obtain Q by removing
|E′|−|V ′|+|NpredG′ (w)| edges from G. To this end, fix a Hamiltonian cycle of G′, then:
• remove from G all original edges that are not in the Hamiltonian cycle; there are exactly |E′|−|V ′| such edges;
• in the Hamiltonian cycle, there are exactly two edges of which w is an end; remove any of those edges in the
undirected network, or the one pointing to w in the directed network; let us denote the removed edge as (v′, w);
• remove all edges from all predecessors of w to v1, with the exception of (v′, v1); there are exactly |NpredG′ (w)|−1
such edges.
In so doing, we have obtained the network Q by removing a total of |E′|−|V ′|+|NpredG′ (w)| edges from G (see figures
6 and 7).
Secondly, we show that if it is possible to obtain Q by removing |E′|−|V ′|+|NpredG′ (w)| edges from G, then there
exists a Hamiltonian cycle in G′. We will first deal with the undirected case, before moving on to the directed case.
In the undirected case, observe that nodes v† and v2 each have a degree of 1 in G, since their only neighbours are w
and v1, respectively. Now since Q is connected, and since we obtained Q by only removing (rather than adding) edges
from G, the nodes v† and v2 must each have a degree of 1 in Q. Consequently, they must be the two ends of Q. This,
in turn, implies that v1 must have exactly two neighbours in Q; we know that one of them is v2, let us call the other v′.
This, as well as the fact that v† is only connected to w, implies that the segment of Q between w and v′ contains all
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𝑤𝑣† 𝑣1 𝑣2
𝑣′ 𝑤 𝑣′
𝑣†
𝑣1
𝑣2
𝑤
𝑣′
𝐺′ 𝐺 𝑄
Figure 6: The main steps of reducing the Hamiltonian cycle problem to the problem of determining whether the
closeness centrality of v† can be reduced to a value ≤ q in an undirected network.
𝐺′
𝑣1
𝑣′
𝑣†
𝑤
𝑤
𝑣† 𝑣1
𝑣′ 𝑤 𝑣′
𝑄𝐺
Figure 7: The main steps of reducing the Hamiltonian cycle problem to the problem of determining whether the
closeness centrality of v† can be reduced to a value ≤ q in a directed network.
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original nodes from G′ and only original edges from G′ (recall that we did not add any edges between original nodes).
Finally, by adding to that segment the original edge between v′ and w, we obtain a Hamiltonian cycle in G′.
As for the directed case, we observe that node v† has only one successor in Q, namely w, and only one predecessor
inQ, namely v1. We also know that v1 has only one predecessor inQ; let us call that predecessor v′. These facts imply
that the segment of Q between w and v′ contains all original nodes from G′ and only original edges from G′ (again,
recall that we did not add any edges between original nodes). By adding to that segment the original edge between v′
and w, we obtain a Hamiltonian cycle in G′.
We have shown that a Hamiltonian cycle in G′ exists if and only if it is possible to reduce the closeness centrality
of v† to q by removing exactly |E′|−|V ′|+|NpredG′ (w)| edges from G, which concludes the proof. 2
Theorem 2 Disguising betweenness centrality is NP-complete.
Proof. The decision version of the optimization problem is the following: given a network G = (V,E), a source node
v†, two sets Rˆ ⊆ E, Aˆ ⊆ (V × V ) \ E, a budget b ∈ N and a value x ∈ R, does there exist two sets R∗ ⊆ (E \ Rˆ)
and A∗ ⊆ (V × V ) \ (E ∪ Aˆ) such that |A∗|+|R∗|≤ b, and the network (V, (E ∪ A∗) \ R∗) is connected (strongly
connected if G is directed) and cbetw((V, (E ∪A∗) \R∗), v†) ≤ x?
This problem is in NP, as given a solution, i.e., two sets A∗ and R∗, we can verify whether cbetw((V, (E ∪ A∗) \
R∗), v†) ≤ x in polynomial time; this only requires computing the betweenness centrality of node v† in network
(V, (E ∪A∗) \R∗).
We will now show that the decision version is NP-hard. To this end, we propose a reduction from the NP-complete
Set cover problem. The decision version of this problem is defined by a universe U = {u1, . . . , ul} and a collection
of sets S = {S1, . . . , Sm} such that ∀jSj ⊂ U , where the goal is to determine whether there exist k ≤ m elements of
S the union of which equals U .
𝑣1
𝑢1
𝑢2
𝑢3
...
𝑆1
𝑆2
𝑆𝑚
𝑣0
𝑢𝑙
...
𝑣†
Figure 8: Undirected network used to reduce the Set
cover problem to our problem of disguising the be-
tweenness centrality of v†. To solve both problems, we
consider adding (some of) the dashed edges.
...
...
𝑣1
𝑢1
𝑢2
𝑢3
𝑆1
𝑆2
𝑆𝑚
𝑣0
𝑢𝑙
𝑣†
Figure 9: A directed network used to reduce the Set
cover problem to our problem of disguising the be-
tweenness centrality of v†. To solve both problems, we
consider adding (some of) the dashed edges.
First, let us create a network G as shown in figures 8 and 9. More specifically, we create one node for every Sj ∈ S,
one node for every ui ∈ U , and three additional nodes, v†, v0 and v1. Next, we add (either undirected or directed)
edges as follows. We add the edges (v†, v0) and (v1, v†), and for every node ui ∈ Sj we add the edges (Sj , ui) and
(ui, v1). In case of a directed network, we also add the edges (ui, Sj) and (v1, ui) for every ui ∈ Sj , as well as the
edge (v0, v1).
Now, consider the problem of disguising the betweenness centrality of v† in G given Rˆ = E and Aˆ = (V × V ) \
{(S1, v0), . . . , (Sm, v0)}. Note that v† “controls” (i.e., lies on) every shortest path to v0, and does not control any
shortest path between any other pair of nodes. As such, to minimize the betweenness centrality of v†, we need to
create alternative shortest paths to v0; this should be done by adding (some of) the edges in {(S1, v0), . . . , (Sm, v0)},
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since no other edge can be added, and no edge can be removed (following the definitions of Rˆ and Aˆ). To be more
precise, we can add at most b edges {(S1, v0), . . . , (Sm, v0)}, since we cannot exceed the budget. After this process,
the betweenness centrality of v† may drop to as little as q = 2(n−1)(n−2) in the undirected case, or as little as q =
1
(n−1)(n−2) in the directed case; this happens when v
† no longer controls any of the shortest paths to v0 except for the
one from v1 to v0. Note that adding an edge (Sj , v0) creates a new shortest path from every nodes ui ∈ Sj to v0. This
implies that the betweenness centrality of v† can be reduced to q if and only if there exists at most b elements of S the
union of which equals U .
We have just reduced the decision version of the Set Cover problem given k to the following decision problem:
Given network G and budget b = k, where Rˆ = E and Aˆ = (V × V ) \ {(S1, v0), . . . , (Sm, v0)}, determine whether
it is possible to reduce the closeness centrality of v† to some value ≤ q, by removing at most b edges from G. 2
Theorem 3 Both the global and the individual influence recovery problems are NP-hard under the Independent Cas-
cade model.
Proof. We show a reduction from the NP-complete Set cover problem, defined by a universe U = {u1, . . . , ul} and a
collection of sets S = {S1, . . . , Sm} such that S1∪ . . .∪Sm = U and ∀jSj ⊆ U , and the goal is to determine whether
there exist k ≤ m elements of S the union of which equals U .
To this end, let us create a network G as illustrated in figures 10 and 11. In more detail, we start by creating one
node for every Sj ∈ S, one node for every ui ∈ U , and one additional node v†. After that, for every Sj ∈ S and every
ui ∈ Sj , we add the edge (Sj , ui) (either directed or undirected). In the directed case we additionally add an edge
(ui, v
†) for every ui ∈ U .
𝑣†
𝑆1 …
…
𝑆2 𝑆𝑚
𝑢1 𝑢𝑙𝑢2 𝑢3
Figure 10: Undirected network used to reduce the Set
cover problem to our influence recovery problem. To
solve both problems, we consider adding (some of) the
dashed edges.
𝑣†
𝑆1 …
…
𝑆2 𝑆𝑚
𝑢1 𝑢𝑙𝑢2 𝑢3
Figure 11: A directed network used to reduce the Set
cover problem to our influence recovery problem. To
solve both problems, we consider adding (some of) the
dashed edges.
Consider the influence recovery problem in G under the Independent Cascade model, where:
• Aˆ = (V × V ) \ {(v†, S1), . . . , (v†, Sm)};
• p : V × V → [0, 1] such that ∀Sj∈S p(v†, Sj) = 1 and ∀Sj∈S∀ui∈Sj p(Sj , ui) = 1, and p(v, w) = 0 for every
other pair of nodes;
• for individual influence recovery, ∀ui∈Uf(ui) = 1 and f(v) = 0 for every other node;
• for global influence recovery, φ = k + l.
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The goal is then to identify the smallest subset of edges to be added to the network, A ⊆ {(v†, S1), . . . , (v†, Sm)},
such that either inf (V,E∪A)(v
†) ≥ φ in the global variant of the problem, or ∀vi∈V inf (V,E∪A)(v†, vi) ≥ f(vi) in the
individual variant of the problem.
Recall that the influence of v† is measured by setting the seed set as {v†} and calculating the probability that other
nodes get activated. Also recall that under the Independent Cascade model an active node, v, activates any of its
predecessors, w, with probability p(v, w). Importantly, with the p function defined as above, adding an edge (v†, Sj)
for some Si ∈ S makes the influence of v† on every ui ∈ Sj equal to 1. Furthermore, the above definitions of φ
and f imply that our goal (in both the individual and the global variants of the problem) is achieved if and only if the
influence of v† on every node ui ∈ U equals 1. Consequently, our goal is achieved if and only if we add to G a set of
edges, A ⊆ {(v†, S1), . . . , (v†, Sm)}, such that: ⋃
(v†,Sj)∈A
Sj = U.
Since we are interested in finding the smallest such subset, a solution to the above instance of the influence recovery
problem gives us a solution to the Set Cover problem. 2
Theorem 4 Both the global and the individual influence recovery problems are NP-hard under the Linear Threshold
model.
Proof. We show a reduction from the NP-complete Set cover problem, defined by a universe U = {u1, . . . , ul} and a
collection of sets S = {S1, . . . , Sm} such that S1∪ . . .∪Sm = U and ∀jSj ⊆ U , and the goal is to determine whether
there exist k ≤ m elements of S the union of which equals U .
𝑇1 …
…
𝑇2 𝑇𝑚
𝑢1 𝑢𝑙𝑢2 𝑢3
𝑆1
…
𝑆2 𝑆𝑚
…
𝑠1,1 𝑠1,𝑙 …
𝑠2,1 𝑠2,𝑙 …𝑠𝑚,1
𝑠𝑚,𝑙
𝑣†
Figure 12: Undirected network used to reduce the Set cover problem to our influence recovery problem under the
Linear Threshold model. To solve both problems, we consider adding (some of) the dashed edges.
For the directed case, we create a network G as illustrated earlier in Figure 11. As for the undirected case, we create
G as illustrated in Figure 12. In more detail, for every Sj ∈ S, we create two nodes, namely Sj and Tj , as well as l
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additional nodes, namely sj,1, . . . , sj,l. We also create one node for every ui ∈ U , and finally add the source node, v†.
As for the edges, for every Sj ∈ S and every ui ∈ Sj , we add the edge (Tj , ui). Furthermore, for every node sj,i, we
add the edges (Sj , sj,i) and (sj,i, Tj).
Now consider the influence recovery problem in G under the Linear Threshold model, where:
• Aˆ = (V × V ) \ {(v†, S1), . . . , (v†, Sm)};
• tv = l for every node v ∈ {T1, . . . , Tm} and tv = 1 for every other node;
• for individual influence recovery, ∀ui∈Uf(ui) = 1 and f(v) = 0 for every other node;
• for global influence recovery, φ = k + l for the directed case, and φ = k(l + 2) + l for the undirected case.
The goal is then to identify the smallest subset of edges to be added to the network, A ⊆ {(v†, S1), . . . , (v†, Sm)},
such that either inf (V,E∪A)(v
†) ≥ φ in the global variant of the problem, or ∀vi∈V inf (V,E∪A)(v†, vi) ≥ f(vi) in the
individual variant of the problem.
Recall that the influence of v† is measured by setting the seed set as {v†} and calculating the probability that other
nodes get activated. Also recall that under the Linear Threshold model a node, v, gets activated if the number of its
active predecessors exceeds tv . Note that, with tv defined as above, adding an edge (v†, Sj) in the undirected case
leads to the activation of nodes si,j and Ti, which in turn leads to the activation of every ui ∈ Sj (see Figure 12).
Likewise, in the directed case, adding (v†, Sj) leads to the activation of every ui ∈ Sj (see Figure 11). To put it
differently, when adding (v†, Sj), the influence of v† on every ui ∈ Sj equals 1. Importantly, the above definitions of
φ and f imply that our goal (in both the individual and the global variants of the problem) is achieved if and only if
the influence of v† on every node ui ∈ U equals 1. Those observations imply that our goal is achieved if and only if
we add to G a set of edges, A ⊆ {(v†, S1), . . . , (v†, Sm)}, such that:⋃
(v†,Sj)∈A
Sj = U.
Since we are interested in finding the smallest such subset, a solution to the above instance of the influence recovery
problem gives us a solution to the Set Cover problem. 2
D Empirical Evaluation
D.1 Configuring the ROAM Heuristic
As mentioned in the main article, the ROAM heuristic involves choosing v0 (the neighbour of v† whom the heuristic
will disconnect from v†), and choosing the b−1 neighbours of v† whom the heuristic will connect to v0. We conducted
a number of experiments to determine whether it is more beneficial to choose v0 as the neighbour of v† with the least
connections or the most connections. Likewise, we wanted to determine whether it is more beneficial to choose the
b − 1 neighbours of v† (who will be connected to v0) as the ones with the least connections or the most connections.
In particular, Figure 13 compares the different settings given 50 radomly generated scale-free networks consisting of
100 nodes each, where 3 edges are added with each step of the generation process (for more details, see [4]); we
chose scale-free networks as they resemble real-life networks in many way, e.g., in terms of degree distribution. As
for the source node, it is chosen to be the one with the lowest sum of centrality rankings (ties are broken uniformly at
random). As for the Independent Cascade model, we set the activation probability to be p(v, w) = 0.15 for every pair
of nodes, v, w ∈ V . As for the Linear Threshold model, for every node, v ∈ V , the threshold value, tv , is sampled
uniformly at random from the set {0, . . . , |Npred(v)|}. For both models, the influence values are approximated using
the Monte-Carlo method. In the figure, we write ROAM-x-y(b), where x can either be “max” or “min” (indicating
that v0 is the neighbour with the most connections or the least connections, respectively) and y can either be “max” or
“min” (indicating that the b−1 neighbours are chosen to be the ones with the most connections or the least connections,
respectively), whereas b represents the budget (which is set to 3 in this experiment). Since the results are averaged over
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50 random networks, the error bars in the figure represent the 95% confidence intervals. For each network, the ROAM
heuristic is executed multiple, consecutive times; the x-axis in each subfigure represents the number of executions. As
can be seen, while there is no setting that dominates the others, the best overall performance seems to be achieved by
ROAM-max-min(3). Based on this, in all subsequent experiments on ROAM, we choose v0 as the neighbour of v†
with the most connections, and we connect v0 to the b− 1 neighbours of v† with the least connections.
.
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Figure 13: Comparing different settings of ROAM on 50 randomly generated scale-free network consisting of 100
nodes, with 3 edges added in each step of the generation process. For each such network, ROAM is executed multiple,
consecutive times (the x-axis represents the number of executions). The subfigures show the source node’s ranking
(according to different centrality measures), and the relative change in its influence value (according to different
influence models).
In the main article, due to space constraints, we only specified how the two main steps of ROAM can be applied on
undirected networks. Next, we specify how these steps are modified to work on directed networks. First of all, v0 is
not chosen among the neighbours of v†, but rather among the successors of v†. This is mainly because removing a
successor of v† reduces its closeness centrality, whereas removing a predecessor has no such impact. As for the b− 1
neighbours of v† to be connected to v0, they are chosen among the predecessors of v†; for each such predecessor,
vi, we add the edge (vi, v0). This is mainly because it could potentially rebuild the influence of v† on v0, which was
hampered by the removal of the edge (v†, v0). Furthermore, for every shortest path that contains the edge (v†, vi), the
addition of (vi, v0) could create a new alternative shortest path that does not pass through v†, thus further reducing the
betweenness centrality of v†.
D.2 Experimental Results
In the main article, we only presented some of the our experimental results due to space constraints; in this subsection,
we present all of our experimental results. Although most of the experimental details can be found in the main
article, we add here the only missing detail, which concerns the anonymized fragments of the social networks of
Facebook, Twitter and Google+ (note that the fragments of Twitter and Google+ are the only directed networks in
our experiments; the remaining networks are all undirected). all anonymized fragments were taken from SNAP—the
Stanford Network Analysis Platform [21].
• Facebook: the small fragment consists of 61 nodes and 272 edges; the medium one consists of 333 nodes and
2523 edges; the large one consists of 786 nodes and 14027 edges;
• Twitter: the small fragment consists of 201 nodes and 2503 edges; the medium one consists of 247 nodes and
8041 edges; the large one consists of 235 nodes and 15957 edges;
• Google+: the small fragment consists of 108 nodes and 2884 edges; the medium one contains 215 nodes and
7132 edges; the large one consists of 338 nodes and 12341 edges.
Our experimental results for the ROAM heuristic are all presented in figures 16, 17 and 18, which can be found at
the end of this document.
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E Constructing a Network from Scratch
Having studied the problem of disguising a node by rewiring an existing network, we now study the same problem
but from a different perspective, where the goal is to construct a network from scratch, designed for the sole purpose
of concealing the source node, v†. In this section, we will restrict our attention to undirected networks. Specifically,
given n nodes, our goal is to identify a topology in which v† has a reasonably-high influence, while at the same time
ensuring that a certain number of nodes is ranked higher than v† according to each of the three centrality measures. To
tackle this problem, we propose what we call a Lieutenant network, the structure of which is detailed in the box below.
The Lieutenant network of size n:
• Label one node as the source node, v†;
• Label two groups of lieutenants, containing k nodes each, namely: L = {l1, . . . , lk} and L′ = {l′1, . . . , l′k};
• Label all remaining nodes as M = {m1, . . . ,mλ} where λ = n− 2k − 1; these are called members;
• Connect the source node to every lieutenant;
• Connect every lieutenant in L to every one in L′;
• Connect every member to exactly c lieutenants from L and exactly c lieutenants from L′ while ensuring that
the degrees of lieutenants differ by at most 1.
Here is how the Lieutenant network works. The source node v† only comes into contact with its lieutenants. These
are the ones that are supposed to conceal v† by ensuring that they are each ranked higher than v† according to the three
standard centrality measures. These are also the nodes that are supposed to pass on the influence of v† to the rest of
the network. Figure 14 illustrates a sample Lieutenant network with c = 2.
...
...
m1 m2 m𝜆
...
𝑙1
′
𝑙2
′
𝑙𝑘
′
𝑙1
𝑙2
𝑙𝑘
𝑣†
Figure 14: An illustration of a Lieutenant network with c = 2.
Theorem 5 Let f denote the minimum number of members connected to any single lieutenant, i.e., f =
⌊
cλ
k
⌋
. Then,
for every Lieutenant network such that f > k − 1 and f2 > 4ck, all lieutenants have greater degree, closeness and
betweenness centrality than the source node v†.
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Proof. Starting with degree centrality, the degree of the source node, v†, is cdegr(G, v†) = 2kn−1 , since it is only
connected to lieutenants. On the other hand, the degree of a lieutenant, li, is cdegr(G, li) ≥ 1+k+fn−1 , since it is
connected to the source node, to all lieutenants from the other group, and to at least f members. As such, we have:
cdegr(G, li)− cdegr(G, v†) ≥ f − k + 1
n− 1
Therefore, cdegr(G, li) > cdegr(G, v†) for all li ∈ L ∪ L′ when f > k − 1.
Moving on to closeness centrality, for any given node, v, this centrality depends inversely on the sum of the lengths
of shortest paths from v to every other nodes, i.e.,
∑
u∈V dG(v, u). For both the source node and every lieutenant, the
distance to every other node is either 1 or 2. More precisely, for every v ∈ {v†}∪L∪L′, we have: ∑u∈V dG(v, u) =
1|N(v)|+2(n − |N(v)|) = 2n − |N(v)|. Consequently, whenever all lieutenants have greater degree centrality than
v†, they must also have greater closeness centrality than v†. This in turn implies that cclos(G, li) > cclos(G, v†) for
all li ∈ L ∪ L′ when f > k − 1.
Finally, regarding betweenness centrality, let δ(v) denote:
∑
u,w∈V \{v}:u6=w
|{p∈spG(u,w):v∈p}|
|spG(u,w)| . Then the between-
ness centrality of a node v ∈ V can be written as: cbetw(G, v) = 2(n−1)(n−2)δ(v). Furthermore, for any two lieu-
tenants, u,w ∈ L ∪ L′ : u 6= w, let γu,w denote the number of members that are neighbours to both of them, i.e.,
γu,w = |M ∩NG(u) ∩NG(w)|. Note that, for every pair of lieutenants belonging to the same group, the source node
belongs to exactly one of the shortest path between those two lieutenants. Based on this, we have:
δ(v†) =
∑
u,w∈L:u6=w
1
k + 1 + γu,w
+
∑
u,w∈L′:u 6=w
1
k + 1 + γu,w
By observing that for any a, b > 0 we have 1a+b <
1
a , we conclude that:
δ(v†) <
∑
u,w∈L:u6=w
1
k + 1
+
∑
u,w∈L′:u 6=w
1
k + 1
Now since the number of pairs of different lieutenants from each group is k(k−1)2 <
k(k+1)
2 , then:
δ(v†) < k
Having analyzed δ(v†), let us now analyze δ(li) for some lieutenant li ∈ L (the same analysis can be done for a
lieutenant lj ∈ L′). In particular, since li belongs to shortest paths (i) between every pair of lieutenants from the
other group, (ii) between the source node and every member connected to li, and (iii) between every pair of members
connected to li, we have:
δ(li) =
∑
u,w∈L′:u 6=w
1
k + 1 + γu,w
+
∑
v∈M∩N(li)
1
2c
+
∑
u,w∈M∩N(li):u 6=w
1
|spG(u,w)|
By omitting the first term of the right-hand side of the equation and observing that |M ∩ N(li)|≥ f and |{{u,w} ⊆
M ∩N(li)}|≥ f(f−1)2 and |spG(u,w)|≤ 2c for every u,w ∈M ∩N(li) : u 6= w, we end up with the following:
δ(li) >
f
2c
+
f(f − 1)
4c
>
f2
4c
Finally, by comparing δ(v†) with δ(li), we find that:
δ(li)− δ(v†) > f
2
4c
− k
Therefore, if f2 > 4ck every lieutenant has higher betweenness centrality than the source node. 2
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As stated in the theorem, a Lieutenant network can indeed conceal its source node as far as centrality is concerned.
On the other hand, as far as influence is concerned, we evaluate the network empirically to see how the different
parameters affect the influence of the source node. To this end, given a Lieutenant network of 400 nodes, we varied
the parameters of the network, namely k (the size of each lieutenant group) and c (the number of lieutenants from
each group, connected to any given member). For every pair, (k, c), we measured the difference in centrality between
the source node, v†, and any given lieutenant (the greater the difference, the more v† is disguised), and measured the
influence of v† to see how this influence is affected by the disguising process.
The results are depicted in Figure 15, where the x-axis represents k and the y-axis represents c.4 Roughly speaking,
the results can be categorized into four categories:
• small k and small c: This yields relatively high levels of disguise in terms of betweenness, but not in terms
of degree and closeness. On the other hand, it yields rather low levels of Independent-Cascade influence and
Linear-Threshold influence;
• small k and large c: This yields relatively high levels of disguise in terms of degree and closeness, but not in
terms of betweenness. On the other hand, it yields relatively high levels of Independent-Cascade influence, but
not Linear-Threshold influence;
• large k and small c: This yields relatively low levels of disguise in terms of degree, closeness and betweenness.
On the other hand, it yields relatively high levels of Linear-Threshold influence, but not Independent-Cascade
influence;
• large k and large c: This yields relatively low levels of disguise in terms of degree, closeness and betweenness.
On the other hand, it yields relatively high levels of Independent-Cascade influence, but not Linear-Threshold
influence.
For future work, it would be interesting to identify other network structures that manage to disguise the source node
according to all three centrality measures, while at the same time maintaining high levels of influence according to
both models of influence.
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Figure 15: Given a Lieutenant netowrk of 400 nodes, with different values of parameter k (the x-axis) and parameter
c (the y-axis), the figure depicts the difference in centrality between the v† and a lieutenant, as well as the influence
value of v†.
4we set max(c) ≤ min(k) to ensure that we have a value in every cell of the grid; otherwise some cells would correspond to networks in
which the are no sufficient lieutenants to connect to.
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Figure 16: Consecutive execution of ROAM (the x-axis represents the number of executions). Specifically, given
different random networks, the subfigures show the source node’s ranking (according to the centrality measures), and
the relative change in its influence value (according to the influence models). Results are shown for ROAM(b) : b =
2, 3, 4, where b is the budget in each execution.
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Figure 17: Consecutive execution of ROAM (the x-axis represents the number of executions). Given three terrorist
networks, and different fragments of Facebook’s network, the subfigures show the source node’s ranking (according
to the centrality measures), and the relative change in its influence value (according to the influence models). Results
are for ROAM(b) : b = 2, 3, 4, where b is the budget in each execution.
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Figure 18: Consecutive execution of ROAM (the x-axis represents the number of executions). Given different frag-
ments of the social networks of Twitter and Google+, the subfigures show the source node’s ranking (according to the
centrality measures), and the relative change in its influence value (according to the influence models). Results are for
ROAM(b) : b = 2, 3, 4, where b is the budget in each execution.
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Figure 19: Executing DICE multiple, consecutive rounds (the x-axis represents the percentage of completed rounds)
in undirected random networks.
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Figure 20: Executing DICE multiple, consecutive rounds (the x-axis represents the percentage of completed rounds)
in undirected real-life networks.
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Figure 21: Executing DICE multiple, consecutive rounds (the x-axis represents the percentage of completed rounds)
in directed real-life networks.
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Figure 22: Average concealment-measure value in each experiment. The results for the directed networks (namely the
fragments of Twitter and Google+) are presented separately.
